The attributional reformulation of the learned helplessness model of depression proposes that causal attributions about negative outcomes play a causal role in reactive depression. This research tested this hypothesis by studying the causal role of attributions in depression in 180 college students. On two occasions separated by 1 month, students were administered a battery of tests that included an attributional style questionnaire and the Beck Depression Inventory. The attributional dimensions of internality, stability, and globality were found to be correlated with depression; when the possible causal role of attributions was tested through the use of cross-lagged panel correlational analysis, the hypothesis that stability and globality attributions for bad outcomes might be causes of depression was supported. There was no support, however, for the hypothesis that internal attributions for bad outcomes are a cause of depression. Evidence was also found that unstable attributions for good outcomes may function as a cause of depression.
depression can be found in several studies of attributional patterns among college students (cf. Klein, Fencil-Morse, & Seligman, 1976; Kuiper, 1978; Ri/ley, 1978) . More direct evidence regarding the role of attributional style in depression, however, can be found in a recent study by Seligman et al. (1979) . In that study, college students were asked to fill out the Beck Depression Inventory (BDI; Beck, 1967) and a questionnaire designed to assess their attributions about the causes for various good and bad events. Scores on the BDI were found to be positively correlated with the subjects' stable, global, and internal attributions for bad outcomes, and negatively correlated with their tendency to make stable and internal attributions for good outcomes. The results thus lent support to both the reformulated model of depression advocated by Abramson et al. (1978) and the extension of that model developed by Seligman et al. (1979) . As noted by the latter authors, however, the correlations obtained between depression and attribution scores did not provide any evidence that attributions play a causal role in depression; it is obvious that the conclusion that depression causes individuals to attribute bad outcomes to internal, stable, and global causes is an equally tenable interpretation of the positive correlations between attri-butions and depression. In addition, correlations between attributions and depression may occur as a result of the causal effects of some third variable on both. In a recent study, Covington and Omelich (1979) found that causal attributions made after failure were in some instances self-serving, defensive reactions to performance following failure rather than the causes of that performance. Although the Covington and Omelich (1979) study was not specifically concerned with depression, its results serve to further make salient the point that a correlation between attributions and depression does not necessarily indicate that attributions cause depressive symptoms.
The present study was designed to test the assumption that causal attributions for negative outcomes cause symptoms of depression as proposed by Abramson et al. (1978) . The suggested causal role of attributions following good outcomes (Seligman et al., 1979) was also tested. One procedure for testing assumptions about causality from correlational data is through the use of crosslagged panel correlation analysis (Kenny, 1975 (Kenny, , 1979 Kenny & Harackiewicz, 1979) . In employing this procedure, measures of attributional style (A) and depression (D) are obtained at two different points in time; the four measures so obtained yield two cross-lagged correlations (r MD2 and 7^201) as well as two autocorrelations (r A1A2 and 0102) and two synchronous correlations (/• A IDI and r A2D 2) (see Figure 1 ). The two cross-lagged correlations can be expressed as a cross-lagged differential (r MV2 -^201)-When assumptions of synchronicity, stationarity and equal stability are met (see Cook, & Campbell, 1979; Kenny 1975) , a crosslagged analysis is a test for spuriousness, that is, of whether or not the relationship between any two variables (here, attributional style and depression) results from the effects of some third, unspecified, variable rather than from the causal effects of either. If an explanation of a relationship in terms of spuriQusness can be rejected, then, assuming the two cross-lagged correlations are of the same sign, a finding that |r A ip2l>kA2Dil would, in the present example, indicate that attributional style might be a cause of depression; a finding in the opposite direction would, conversely, indicate that depression might be a cause of attributional style. Cross-lagged analysis does not demonstrate causality in the same way as true experiments in which the effects of spuriousness are experimentally controlled; however, such an analysis can provide evidence or serve as an indicator of temporal precedence.
Method

Subjects
Subjects were 206 students enrolled in introductory psychology at the University of Pittsburgh. Each subject agreed to participate in two 1 -hour group testing sessions that were separated by a 1-month interval.
2 Attrition due to incomplete questionnaires or failure to return for the second session resulted in a final sample size of 180 subjects.
Procedure
In each of the two testing sessions, subjects completed a battery of psychological tests consisting of the short 1 Technically, since there are two sources of a causal effect (A and D) and two directions of that effect (positive and negative), there are actually four possible hypotheses to be considered in interpreting cross-lagged differentials (see Kenny, 1975 ).
2 The 1-month time interval was chosen because it seemed an appropriate lag to allow for changes in depressive symptoms in a nonclinical population. Oliver and Burkham (1979) , for example, found that 33% of a student population designated as depressed by the BDI (Beck, 1967) , were considered as nondepressed when again tested 3 or 6 weeks later.
form of the Beck Depression Inventory (BDI; Beck & Beck, 1972) , the Attributional Style Scale (see Seligman et al., 1979) , the revised Janis-Field Feelings of Inadequacy Scale (Robinson & Shaver, 1973) , and the Pleasant Events Schedule, adapted from MacPhillamy and Lewinsohn (Note 1). Four different test orders were employed so that the order of the four tests was counterbalanced among subjects in a Latin square design. The BDI, a widely used measure of depression, has been shown to be a valid measure of depression among college students (Bumberry, Oliver, & McClure, 1978) . The Attributional Style Scale 3 (Semmel, Abramson, Seligman, & von Baeyer, Note 2) has been described in more detail elsewhere (Seligman et al., 1979) . Briefly, this scale involves descriptions of 12 situations, 6 describing good outcomes (e.g., "you do a project which is highly praised") and 6 describing bad outcomes (e.g., "you can't get all the work done that others expect of you"). Each subject was asked to write a major cause of each outcome and then to rate the cause, using a 7-point scale, along external-internal, unstable-stable, and specific-global attributional dimensions. The six attributional style subscales (internality, stability, and globality for both bad and good outcomes) have been reported to have reliability coefficients that average .54 (Seligman et al., 1979) . The Janis-Field scale and the Pleasant Events Schedule were included in the study in order to provide additional variables in the event that perfect stationarity was found not to be tenable and quasi stationarity had to be considered (see Kenny, 1975 ). Table 1 shows the synchronous correlations between scores on the BDI and scores on the subscales of the Attributional Style questionnaire for both testing sessions. Two composite attributional style scores, one for bad outcomes and one for good outcomes, were computed as the sum of the scores on the three attributional style subscales. The correlations of the composite scores with the BDI are also reported in Table 1 .
Results
As Table 1 indicates, attribution subscale scores and the composite score for bad outcomes were significantly correlated with the BDI for both testing sessions; the correlations, however, were small in magnitude and less than those reported by Seligman et al. (1979) . The internality attribution scores for good outcomes were significantly correlated with the BDI for both testing sessions, but the stability, globality, and composite attributional scores for good outcomes were significantly correlated with the BDI only for the second testing session; the correlations were again low, similar to those reported by Seligman et al. (1979) . The correlations for bad outcomes were in accord with the attributional reformulation of the learned helplessness model of depression ; the correlations for good outcomes were consistent with the additional hypotheses proposed by Seligman et al. (1979) .
Because the BDI scores appeared to be positively skewed, logarithmic transformations of the BDI data were carried out, and then synchronous correlations of the log BDI scores with each of the attributional style subscales and composite were again computed. The resulting correlations were virtually identical to those obtained with the untransformed BDI scores; hence, subsequent analyses were based on the untransformed BDI data. Table 2 presents the intercorrelations among the subscales of the attributional style questionnaire for both bad and good outcomes. Since there was a significant degree of overlap between the subscales, the results were analyzed in terms of the composite measure as well as in terms of the subscales.
Turning next to the cross-lagged panel analysis, the autocorrelations, which are presented in Table 3 , were examined first (see Kenny, 1975) . The autocorrelations, which are indices of both the stability and reliability of the variables, were quite reasonable for the conduct of a cross-lagged panel analysis, since they were not too large to preclude a study of change in these variables over time (Kenny, 1975) , and they tend to support the appropriateness of the 1-month time lag employed. Cook and Campbell (1979) have recently pointed out that proper interpretation of a cross-lagged correlational difference rests on the assumption that the autocorrelations are not significantly different; this assumption was tested by comparing the BDI autocorrelations with the autocorrelation for each of the attributional style measures by means of the Pearson-Filon test (see Kenny, 1975) . In no case were the autocorrelations found to be significantly different. A cross-lagged panel analysis also requires a demonstration that the assumptions of synchronicity and stationarity have been met (Kenny, 1975 (Kenny, , 1979 . Synchronicity, usually the easier of the two assumptions to satisfy, has here been met by virtue of the fact that all measures were obtained on the same day and hour for both testing sessions and were not aggregated (see Kenny, 1975) . Satisfying the assumption of stationarity involves demonstrating that the causal process among the variables of interest remains constant over the interval between the times the variables are measured. A lack of change in the synchronous correlations from the first to the second testing session is con- Kenny & Harackiewicz, 1979) . The results of these tests are reported in Table  1 ; in no case were the correlaitons in any pair of synchronous correlations found to be significantly different. Consequently, the results indicated that each cross-lagged panel was characterized by perfect stationarity (Kenny, 1975) . Tests for spuriousness were next conducted. Table 4 shows the cross-lagged correlations between the attributional style measures and the BDI. The differences between the cross-lagged correlations for both stability measures (for bad and good outcomes) and for the globality measure for bad outcomes were found to be significant; the difference between the cross-lagged correlations was not significant for either of the internality measures or for the globality measure for good outcomes. The significant differences between the cross-lagged correlations for the stability and globality measures for bad outcomes appeared to be in accord with the view that such attributions are causes of depressive symptoms ; there was, however, no support for the view that internal attributions for bad outcomes play a causal role in depression. Further, with regard to the hypotheses about the role of attributions for good outcomes (Seligman et al., 1979) , evidence was found to support only the view that unstable attributions for good outcomes may function as causes of depression.
4
Because it is possible for a significant difference in cross-lagged correlations to arise from differential changes in the reliabilities of the two variables in a panel from the first to second testing session (Kenny, 1975) , the interitem reliabilities for each of the variables were computed for each testing session using Cronbach s (1951) alpha; Table 5 reports those reliabilities. As can be seen in this table, for those panels in which a significant difference in cross-lagged correlations was found, only in the case of stability for good outcomes was a question raised about the possible effect of a differential change in reliabilities; here, however, the differential change was such as to produce a cross-lagged correlation difference opposite from that which was found. Hence, in all cases the obtained differences in crosslagged correlations can be considered as indicative of causal predominance. When the reliabilities for those panels in which significant differences in cross-lagged correlations were not found were next examined (see Table 3 Autocorrelations for Attributional Style and Depression " Since the cross-lagged correlations were of different sign, as a more conservative test for spuriousness, the smaller of the two (absolute value) was considered as zero in testing for the significance of the difference. Table 5 ), it was noted that the reliabilities for the internality measure for bad outcomes were relatively low. The internality reliabilities, it should be noted, raise the question of whether the failure to find a significant cross-lagged difference for internality for bad outcomes might not have been attributable to the low reliability of the measure of this attribute. It has been noted that in a cross-lagged panel analysis, causal effects include both direct and indirect effects of the causal variable, and furthermore, there is no procedure for specifying mediational processes with Note. All autocorrelations were significantly different from zero (p < .001). 4 Though the Pearson-Filon tests indicated perfect stationarity for each panel, the test for the globality data for good outcomes approached significance (p < .10). Hence, it appeared that the globality panel for good outcomes might have fit a model of quasi stationarity. In order to determine whether perfect stationarity or quasi stationarity best fit this data, a confirmatory factor analysis was conducted by means of the program LISREL (JOreskog & SSrbom, 1978) . This analysis did not result in rejection of the assumption of perfect stationarity, X 2 (4) = 8.42, but the failure to reject was marginal (p < .10). Hence another test for spuriousness for the good outcome globality data was conducted using crosslagged correlations corrected by LISREL communality ratios (see Kenny & Harackiewicz, 1979) . These correlations, however, were not significantly different. this analysis (Kenny & Harackiewicz, 1979) . In the present case, in which it was found plausible to consider attributions at Time 1 as causes of depression at Time 2, it was conceivable that this direct effect was mediated by the effect of depression at Time 1. In order to test the extent to which depression at Time 1 might have played such an indirect mediational role, the cross-lagged correlations between the attribution subscales at Time 1 and depression at Time 2 were recomputed by employing a path analysis model that partialed out the relationship between depression at Time 2 and depression at Time I. 5 The resulting /-A1D2 correlations for the internality, stability, globality, and composite measures of attributions for bad outcomes were, respectively, .07, .26, .16, and .23; the corresponding correlations for the measures of attributions for good outcomes were -.13, -.16, .0, and -.04. Except for the measure of stability attributions for good outcomes, which did not change, these correlations were slightly lower than the unpartialled correlations (cf. Table 5 ). Pearson-Filon comparisons of the partial correlations with the r A 2Di correlations again showed significant differences for stability, globality, and composite attributions for bad outcomes and for stability attributions for good outcomes. These results showed that such attributions at Time 1 may have had direct causal effects on depression at Time 2, but the magnitude of such effects may have been generally less than was indicated by the unpartialled r A i D2 correlations.
Discussion
The present study was designed to test the central hypothesis of the reformulated learned helplessness model of depression. According to this model the chronicity and generality of depressive symptoms and vicissitudes of self-esteem are determined by the kinds of attributions a person makes about the causes of bad outcomes . The present results showed that stable and global attributions for bad outcomes may act as causes of depressive symptoms, as was proposed by . The findings, although consistent with cognitive theories of depression, were somewhat surprising, since previous research on psychological phenomena not directly related to depression had failed to find any evidence that causal attributions act as causes of subsequent events (e.g., Covington & Omelich, 1979) . The present study, however, is the only one to our knowledge that to date has addressed the question of whether attributions function as causes of depressive symptoms.
As also reported in previous research (Klein et al., 1976 , Kuiper, 1978 , Rizley, 1978 , Seligman, et al., 1979 , attributing bad outcomes to internal causes was found to be correlated with depression. Nevertheless, no evidence was found that such internal attributions play a causal role in depression; this result was surprising in view of the centrality often ascribed to such attributions and to self-blaming behavior in depressed persons Beck, 1976; Hammen & Krantz, 1976; Peterson, 1979) . There are several possible explanations for this result. First, the internal consistencies for the internality measure for bad outcomes were found to be quite low; hence, it is possible that the failure to find evidence for the causal role of internal attributions may have been a consequence of the unreliability of the measure employed. More generally, as Kenny (1979) has noted, because crosslagged panel correlation employs statistical tests that are of low power for detecting differences, nonsignificant differences between cross-lagged correlations should not lead one to accept easily the null hypothesis of spuriousness. Second, it is, of course, quite possible that the relationship between internal attributions and depression is spurious. For example, bad outcomes may, as has often been proposed (e.g., Abramson et al., 1978; Beck, 1976) , engender affective components of depressive symptomatology and concurrently produce, as a concomitant cognitive symptom, internal attributions and selfblame as adaptive, control-oriented responses (see Janoff-Bulman, 1979) or as defensive reactions (see Covington & Omelich, 1979) . Accordingly, affective symptoms and internal attributions covary but are not viewed as causally related. Third, it is possible that there may be a reciprocal causal relationship between internal attributions and depression (see Kenny, 1979) , in which case no cross-lagged correlation difference would be expected; such an interpretation is in accord with Beck's (1976) description of the chain reaction of events that determine the syndrome of depression. Which of the proceeding explanations is most plausible can only be determined by further study.
The finding that a predisposition to make stable and global attributions for bad outcomes may be causally related to depression indicates that depression-prone persons, by virtue of their attributional style, are likely to expect similar outcomes in a wide variety of future circumstances. In short, they are likely to be generally pessimistic (cf. Beck, 1976) . Golin, Jarrett, Stewart, and Drayton (1980) , however, found that informing depression-prone persons of a possible second chance to attain a goal serves to reduce stress experienced during their first attempt at goal attainment. These findings suggest an apparent paradox; depression-prone persons appear to be pessimistic about their prospects for future success and yet are ostensibly less stressed when they have more than one opportunity to attain a goal. This apparent inconsistency suggests that though depression-prone persons are apt to be pessimistic about the outcome of a problem with which they are immediately faced, the stress engendered by such pessimism may be mitigated when the possibility of future reward is made salient (Golin et al., 1980) . Though the attributional reformulation of the learned helplessness model of depression did not specify any hypotheses about the causal role of attributions for good outcomes, Seligman et al., (1979) did suggest that a predisposition to make unstable, specific, and external attributions for good outcomes might be a mediator of depressive symptoms. The present study did find evidence for the causal role of a predisposition to make unstable attributions but not for a specific or an external attributional style. The finding for unstable attributions is consistent with Beck's (1976) conclusion that the depressed person "regards himself as lacking some element or attribute that he considers essential for his happiness" (p. 105). Apparently, the belief that the presence of such elements or attributes may be ephemeral may also influence depressive symptoms.
It should be noted that the correlations between attributions and depression obtained in this study were small. In fact, the JA1D2 correlations for the bad outcome stability, globality, and composite attributional measures indicated that attributions at Time 1 accounted for, respectively, only 10%, 3%, and 8% of the variance in depression at Time 2; the partial r M02 correlations accounted for slightly less. Similarly, the r MD2 correlation for the good outcome stability attributional measure accounted for only 2% of the variance in depression at Time 2. Hence, to the extent that attributions do influence depressive symptoms, the magnitude of the effects of causal attributions relative to the role of many other factors believed to play a role in depression (see Akiskal & McKinney, 1973) remains to be empirically determined.
It should also be noted that the present conclusions about the role of causal attributions are based on a cross-lagged panel correlational analysis. This statistical procedure is an exploratory approach for testing interesting causal hypotheses with correlational data and should be viewed as an indicator of temporal precedence and not as positive proof of causation 6 (Kenny & Harackiewicz, 1979) . Two interpretations of a significant cross-lagged correlational difference are possible. A finding that r MD2 is greater than r A 2Di can be interpreted as indicating either that attributions "cause" an increase in depression or depression "causes" a decrease in attributions (Kenny, 1975) . In the present study the former interpretation was considered to be the more plausible for two reasons. First, the signs of the synchronous correlations (taking into account that the negative correlation for good outcomes indicated that decreases in stability attributions were associated with increasing depression) were supportive of the former interpretation (Kenny, 1975) . Second, the interpretation that attributions "cause" depression was consistent with both the theory considered here Seligman et al., 1979) and clinical observation (Beck, 1976) , whereas the alternative hypothesis was not.
It should be noted that the present research did not study nonnormal, nondepressed subjects; hence the finding that some attributions may be causes of depressive symptoms does not preclude the possibility that such attributions may also mediate symptoms of other disorders. Further, as has often been noted about studies of depression in college student populations (e.g., Golin, Jarrett, Stewart, & Drayton, 1980) , although they are of interest in their own right, it does not necessarily follow that the present findings are generalizable to clinically depressed groups (see Golin & Hartz, 1979) ; the extent to which the present results are applicable to a clinical group can only be determined by further study.
In summary, the present research tested the hypothesis that causal attributions are causes of symptoms of reactive depression. It was found that a predisposition to make stable or global attributions for bad outcomes may be a cause of symptoms of depression. However, a predisposition to make internal attributions for bad outcomes, though correlated with depression, was not found to be a cause of depression in this population. Although this research found that attributional style may be a cause of depression, there was no evidence for a converse relationship, that is, that depression causes individuals to attribute bad outcomes to internal, stable, or global causes.
